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When Great Scholars Disagree
Alan Sica
When Weber analyzed Judaism as part of his series concerning global religious practices and the 
economic arrangements that accompanied them, he decided to employ the term “pariah” as an analytic 
device, but without any of the pejorative connotations which are attached to the word today.  Had he 
used instead Gastvolk (guest people) throughout his book rather than “pariah-people,” many subsequent 
scholars would not have objected to Ancient Judaism in the way they have over the last 90 years.  Ar-
naldo Momigliano, probably the greatest classical historian of the mid-20th century, respected Weber’s 
work, but also took exception to his use of “pariah” regarding Judaism.  This article investigates this 
troubling term and the scholarship that it inspired.
“Many Jews had recently been taken and brought to trial on a charge of clipping coin, 
and early in the next year [A.D. 1279] nearly 300 were put to death.” Gregory’s ‘Chron.’ 
(Camd. Soc.), p. 70; Stow’s ‘Annuals’ (1592), p. 299; Fabyan’s ‘Chron.,’ p. 386.” (from 
Sharpe, 1899: 26n2)
“With his fellow gamblers he was straight as a string at all times—to be otherwise 
would have meant that when he went broke he would stay broke, because none of the 
fraternity would ‘stake’ him. But with his patrons—being regarded by them as a pa-
riah, he acted toward them like a pariah—a prudent pariah. He fooled them with a 
frank show of gentlemanliness, of honesty to his own hurt; under that cover he fleeced 
them well, but always judiciously.” (Phillips, 1905: 234)
“That the status of the Jews in Europe has been not only that of an oppressed people 
but also of what Max Weber has called a ‘pariah people’ is a fact most clearly appreci-
ated by those who have had practical experience of just how ambiguous is the freedom 
which emancipation has ensured, and how treacherous the promise of equality which 
assimilation has held out. In their own position as social outcats such men reflect the 
political status of their entire people.” (Arendt, 1978 [1944]: 68)
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Two Distinct Modes of Living
It is sometimes illuminating in unanticipated ways to consider the lives and 
ideas of scholars in tandem, particularly those seldom viewed together. Re-
flect upon September, 1908, when Max Weber was 44 years old, only several 
years after becoming famous among attentive scholars for his two “Protestant 
Ethic” essays, saturated with and inspired by his own ancestors’ commer-
cial history. Weber was slowly, sufficiently recovering from his catastrophic 
emotional collapse of 1897 to resume writing, reading, and inventing Ger-
man sociology. Meanwhile, on September 5, 1908 in Caraglio (a northwest-
ern Italian town of 5300 souls, 20 miles east of the French border, 50 miles 
north of Nice), Arnaldo Dante Momigliano was born to an influential family 
of enlightened Jews “in a house full of books; Italian books, Hebrew books, 
French books, Latin and Greek writers either in the original or in translation” 
(University of Chicago 1987: 4). 
Weber and Momigliano were as much “born scholars” as anyone has ever 
been. Among other early achievements in vastly different fields of endeavor, 
Weber had written a precocious habilitation in 1891 on Roman agricultural 
history, defending it successfully in person before Theodor Mommsen him-
self (a humbling figure in 1892, even for Mark Twain [Meltzer, 2002: 217; 
Mommsen, 1958: 1]; Mommsen wrote a 50-page review-essay about the book, 
picking it apart, but praising the young titan nonetheless; see Mommsen, 1892). 
Similarly, Momigliano at the age of 24 became associate professor of Greek 
history at the University of Rome, and at 28 the Professor of Roman History 
at the University of Turin. According to his most perspicuous biographer, “By 
1934, when he was twenty-six, he had already published three important mon-
ographs—on the historiography of the Maccabaean revolt, on the reign of the 
Emperor Claudius, and on the political ideals of the Greek cities in the age of 
Philip of Macedon—besides one hundred and fifty articles and reviews. These 
studies showed that Momigliano already possessed extraordinary competence 
in the interpretation of almost every sort of ancient evidence… combined with 
an uncanny gift for intuiting, behind conflicts in the sources, the contours of 
precise cultural and political situations” (Brown, 1989: 409). 
By odd and perverse coincidence, Weber wrote Ancient Judaism around 
1914 when Momigliano was a child, while the latter owed to his Judaism the 
“opportunity” of fleeing to England in 1938, penniless with a wife and daugh-
ter, at the age of 30, having been relieved of his professorship by fascists in 
Turin due to the Racial Laws that condoned his persecution. Moreover: “The 
last letter that Momigliano received from his father reached him in 1942… It 
urged him to take comfort in the prophets, and in Spinoza… Riccardo and 
Ilda [his parents]… had been arrested in late 1943, deported to Germany 
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and killed in an extermination camp. He later told a friend that, at the news, 
he could not even bring himself to cry; he had lost, for the rest of his life, the 
ability to weep” (Brown, 1989: 412). 
As everyone knows, both men produced scholarship of stupendous quanti-
ty and quality, Weber’s mostly unpublished and left in the capable hands of his 
wife and students, Momigliano’s carefully and scrupulously collected in nine 
large volumes that brought together over 775 separate pieces of writing in four 
languages, plus a half-dozen books (Momigliano, 1992). Just as Weber never 
wrote The Magnum Opus one is supposed to create in order to be remem-
bered as a great, tranformative scholar, leaving that job to his wife and her 
assistants when they assembled Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft following his sudden 
death, so Momigliano resisted the call of the Great Book. Instead he wrote a 
lifelong stream of short monographs amidst hundreds of essays and reviews, 
all of them miraculously informed, cosmopolitan, philosophically adept, and 
uncannily sophisticated in a unique style that became his hallmark: “He also 
wrote more than 400 articles, some quite long, for encyclopedias. These were 
never publicistic articles: practically every one of them, also his book reviews, 
was a work of the most rigorous scholarship with numerous footnotes most of 
which contained several bibliograhical references, with full details about vol-
umes, issue numbers, year of publication, and pages. His memory was as ca-
pacious and precise as his interests were broad and deep…” (Shils, 1997: 220).
Momigliano’s former student and longterm friend, Peter Brown, thought 
that the book form constrained Momigliano’s hungry imagination and con-
stant search for better evidence to support his ever-expanding arguments and 
interests; they were “unnecessarily monumental for a man of his style: for a 
book sought a range and a transcendence that did not interest him” (Brown 
1989: 441). One could say almost the same thing regarding Weber. One sus-
pects that had Momigliano been born when Gyorgy Lukács or Ernst Bloch 
were, and had he, like they, been invited to the Webers’ salon in Heidelberg, 
Weber would have found in the Italian historian a boon companion, someone 
from whom he could have learned a great deal, but who would likewise have 
been an avid student of the German’s similarly enormous learning and ana-
lytic capacity. Yet in lieu of having “his Weber,” Momigliano used Gaetano de 
Sanctis and Benedetto Croce as senior sounding boards and inspiring guides 
for correct behavior, politically as well as academically (for Momigliano’s un-
equaled estimate of each, see Momigliano, 1994: 54-71 and 80-96 respective-
ly). While the former remains little known in the U.S. owing to a lack of trans-
lations, the latter became the official spokesman for “civilized, liberal Italy” 
during and after Mussolini’s reign, and it was he who invited Momigliano to 
head a cultural institute in Naples following WWII, to be set up in Croce’s 
own mansion. Luckily for us all, Momigliano wisely refused, becoming in-
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stead a cosmopolitan intellectual with academic homes in Chicago, London, 
and Pisa, and a global audience which would have escaped him had he moved 
to Naples. The Times of London referred to him in his obituary as “the most 
learned and the most universal historian of his age” (September 7, 1987).
In the anglophone sphere, Weber’s life and work have become almost too 
well known, with speculations sinking to the level of “serious” debate about 
whether Marianne Weber was the true “love of his life” (see recent issues of 
Max Weber Studies), or whether Weber’s four uses in private letters of the perjo-
rative term Knalljude makes him ipso facto an anti-Semite (Roth, 2012). Mo-
migliano, on the other hand, if known at all beyond the small circle of scholars 
interested in the history of historiography, or the ancient Occident, is remem-
bered mostly for his more “popular” writings in The New York Review of Books 
and The Times Literary Supplement. In 2009 an online debate erupted regarding 
the lack of youthful participants in a Warburg Institute conference celebrating 
Momigliano’s work. One younger scholar wisely reminded his older colleagues 
that during the ensuing 22 years since his death in 1987, novice historians 
have not found his name on their doctoral reading lists mostly because the 
“one big book” is missing, and many of his essays remain in foreign languages 
(Magistra et Mater, 2009). This neglect was not always the case. Not only 
did he help inform Robert Graves when writing his best-selling novels about 
Claudius (Graves, 1989, p. viii) and the great BBC show which followed it, but 
he figured centrally in Iris Murdoch’s 1956 novel, The Flight from the Enchanter 
as Peter Saward (see Chapter 3 for a comical portrait of Momigliano’s office 
and research practices; Murdoch, 1956)—an immortalization which the real 
Saward himself was not hesitant to point out when talking with friends.
Momigliano’s devoted, adoring friend, Edward Shils, begins his memoir 
about him this way: “Arnaldo Dante Momigliano was a very great scholar. 
Officially he was an ancient historian, a historian of Greece and Rome. He 
was, however, as much at home in Jewish history. He was, of course, a mas-
ter at the highest level of political history but even more of the culture of all 
Mediterranean antiquity, especially its religious and historical writings. Ad-
ministrative organization, military affairs, law, education—he read all the 
literature of all these subjects in all the languages in which such works ap-
peared” (Shils, 1997: 219). 
One Scholar to Another
Sad to say, though, Momigliano did not comment at length on Weber’s Ro-
man historiography (the sole instance is Momigliano, 1982: 29-31; reprinted 
in 1994: 248-51) even though Weber seemed to become his model of sociologi-
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cal reasoning whenever he wished to deal in “large perspectives” (Shils, 1997: 
229). Eight entries, some redundant, for Momigliano’s work are found in the 
largest biliography pertaining to Weber in English (Sica, 2004: 234). Shils 
claims that “He wrote five papers in which Max Weber was the main object 
of discussion… But he himself did not adduce Max Weber’s ideas in his own 
analyses. In the one essay devoted exclusively to Weber, i.e, on the Jews as a 
‘pariah-people,’ he thought Max Weber was wrong. Nevertheless, Weber’s 
work was frequently invoked as indicative of the kind of thing ancient histo-
rians should deal with. Sometimes other scholars were censured for having 
failed to consider Weber’s views” (ibid.) 
Momigliano only gave sustained attention to Weber’s lifework in “Two 
Types of Universal History” (Momigliano, 1986), a unique comparing of E.A 
Freeman (1823-1892), a once famous British historian of the grand scale, with 
Weber’s most synoptic analytic aspirations procured by “ideal types.” Where-
as Freeman’s ideas and dreams of a world propitiously arranged and sustained 
for white Europeans, by means of a global federation of governments, have 
become impossible to review without accompanying laughter, “Max Weber 
stands for the sociologist who most precisely tried to define the methods and 
the limits of understanding alien civilizations when the conflict of values and 
presuppostions becomes patent” (ibid., 122). Momigliano wanted to answer an 
ancient but no less pressing question: How does an historian or social scientist 
reasonably and responsibly compare societies with sharply differing norma-
tive structure so that something approaching “objectivity” might be deliv-
ered? “Consequently the problem arose whether the members of one group 
or race, being conditioned in their mental equipment by the culture to which 
they belonged, were qualified to pass judgment on the members of another 
group or on other groups as such… Any recent attempt to write universal 
history has had to reckon with this preliminary problem—namely, the legiti-
macy of understanding another culture in terms of the categories of one’s own 
culture” (ibid.). Momigliano believed that Weber, almost despite himself, came 
to realize that in order to achieve his analytic goal of understanding global 
socio-economic processes over time, he “was increasingly driven to place re-
ligion at the centre of his historical understanding.” This was so much the 
case that “there is some justification in taking Freeman’s universal history as 
oriented towards the Greek type and Max Weber’s universal history as ori-
ented towards the Jewish type” (ibid., 123), presumably due in part to Weber’s 
fascination with the Jewish prophets.
Weber comes in for praise by Momigliano because he overcame a vig-
orous nationalistic, patriotic worldview as necessary to his scholarly respon-
sibilities, especially when assessing “the co-existence of incompatible racial 
groups… The great German patriot refused to consider race, nation, and 
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even state, as objective realities from which to start” in his pursuit of “Uni-
versalgeschichtliche Probleme” with which he began his Sociology of Religion (ibid., 
128). It is clear from Momigliano’s analysis that he admires Weber’s strenuous 
attempt to gain the moral highground of scholarly objectivity, to guide sociol-
ogy away from the rampant chauvinisms which plagued Europe in the belle 
epoque, and from which early social scientists were hardly immune. Reading 
Momigliano is seldom anything short of bracing and surprising at turns, as 
when he modestly admits “I must immediately add that I am under no il-
lusion of having fully understood the limits and the function of religion in 
Weber’s thought. Religion is clearly not the only form of subjective experience 
indisputably leading to social action (it is worth remembering the place music 
had in Weber’s theory)” (ibid., 129). Who but Momigliano would remember 
Weber’s Musiksoziologie in this context? 
In pages filled with precise and fair-minded summaries and plumbing of 
Weber’s sociology of religion, his theory of political power, the city, social action 
and meaning, formal versus substantive rationality, and the function of secular 
and sacred intellectuals, Momigliano gives Weber his due even when correcting 
him in small points or large. E.g., “What was new was the attempt to analyse 
with a uniform method the role of Confucian literati, brahmins, prophets and 
rabbis inside their respective societies. I am not aware that anything of similar 
scope had been attempted before… For Max Weber, the task of the intellec-
tuals was to give worldly dimensions to unworldly creeds” (ibid., 130-31). The 
issue of rationality loomed large both in Weber’s work, and in Momigliano’s 
appraisal of it: “Rationality, needless to say, is another difficult and complex no-
tion in Max Weber who sometimes opposed rationality in relation to plurality 
of values… But Max Weber was never absolutely certain that the rationality he 
found most congenial was that of capitalism. Many of the most difficult ques-
tions Weber asked himself come to the surface in his treatment of Judaism, the 
most extensive and ambitious he ever planned for any religion. What we have 
is only a small part of what he intended to write” (ibid., 131-32). As is his style 
when appraising the quality of historiography produced by scholars from vari-
ous epochs, from Herodotus to Gibbon, to Ranke, Grote, Mommsen or Weber, 
Momigliano judiciously pointed to certain weaknesses in Ancient Judaism, mostly 
concerning Weber’s limited knowledge of the requisite languages, especially 
Aramaic. Weber also relied upon standard historians of Jewish thought who 
are no longer viewed as unimpeachable, e.g., Julius Wellhausen. But even with 
qualifications, Momigliano observes that “Unlike his Protestant colleagues, 
he could understand both prophets and rabbis; and unlike Jewish scholars, he 
knew about other religions” (ibid., 132), a capacity he admires. 
It is only when Weber’s text displays “certain ambivalences in [his] at-
titude to the Jews” that Momigliano pulls away from admiration and begins 
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to register minor dismay. In fact, it is here where Momigliano’s capacity for 
wide-scale synthesis comes into play, providing the most intriguing part of his 
critique. 
Intellectually, it is easy to find in the research on Judaism even more echoes 
of  Nietzsche than in Weber’s other works. As always, he must have had Marx 
in mind. He certainly demonstrated that he knew much more about Jews and 
Judaism than Marx ever did. The very word pariah which he chose to define 
the Jews even before the destruction of  the Second Temple is an indication of  
this ambiguity. Hannah Arendt—the pupil of  Max Weber’s friend and pupil, 
Karl Jaspers—did much to rescue the word pariah in her fine collection of  es-
says published in 1947, Die verborgene Tradition, but the ambiguity remains and 
has more than biographical implications (133).
With all this in mind, Momigliano ends his all-too-brief examination of 
Ancient Judaism with this remarkable comment: “In spite of his own warning 
against the prophets Max Weber had gone back to the prophets to try to un-
ravel the inner structure of social action” (ibid., 134).
Whose “Pariah”?
Easily the most widely quoted of Momigliano’s comments about Weber’s work, 
as Shils hints, is “A Note on Max Weber’s Definition of Judaism as a Pariah 
Religion” (Momigliano, 1980; reprinted in Momigliano, 1984). In fact, it is 
likely the best known of all his writings in English simply because it mixes 
several “irresistible” ingredents: Weber, Judaism, and the troubling concept 
of “pariah.” The fact that Momigliano takes exception to a fundamental tenet 
of Weber’s sociology of comparative religion makes it all the more intriguing 
and worth quoting in today’s atmosphere, wherein broad-scale studies of reli-
gion have once again become fashionable among even the most sophisticated 
thinkers (e.g., Habermas, Charles Taylor, Robert Bellah, et al.). 
For some Weberians or specialists in Jewish history, this small argument might 
seem to have run its course. It has been on the agenda ever since Itzak Schiper, 
a Polish sociologist, evaluated Weber’s sociology of Judaism in 1924 (Schiper, 
1959) and Julius Guttmann wrote about it in 1925, soon after Weber’s sociology 
of religion was published as part of Wirtschaft und Gesell-schaft (Guttmann, 1925). 
Neither of these early evaluations seriously damaged Weber’s overall interpreta-
tion of ancient Jewish thought and its manifold connection to socio-economic 
action, though both pointed out shortcomings qua Jewish theological history. 
Schiper rejected the pariah motif, as have so many following him. 
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The most thorough, nearly heroic interpretation of Weber’s portrait of 
Jews as a pariah-people was published in 1968 by Efraim Shmueli, a virtual 
monograph, which would seem to lay the entire debate to rest (Shmueli, 1968: 
167-247). Shmueli’s analysis serves as the touchstone for all commentaries at-
tempted in the decades since he voiced his objections, most of which turned 
around Weber’s view, based on his theory of social action, that Judaism affect-
ed an individual’s behavior rather than seeing its believers as part of a collec-
tive identity. He also faulted Weber regarding the role of political leadership 
among the “charismatic” Jews. Both Abraham (1992: 12n33-13n34, who mis-
spells Shmueli’s name throughout) and Wolfgang Schluchter (1989: 526n70) 
take issue with Shmueli in part, but also give him credit for reasonable objec-
tions to Weber’s broad strokes when assessing Jewish history. Schluchter also 
chronicled the debate in detail, mentioning a string of interrelated interroga-
tions by Werner Cahnman, Jakob Taubes, Günter Stemberger, and Hans G. 
Liebeschütz (Schluchter, 1989: 534-35). 
Freddy Raphael tackled Ancient Judaism along with others who joined the 
fray (Raphael, 1973), like Tony Fahey (1982), so it became clear that there 
were certain features of Weber’s treatment that Jewish scholars in particular 
found bothersome, and these objections often turned around the term “pa-
riah.” Taking a slightly different approach, Jack Barbalet reconsiders The 
Protestant Ethic in its first (1905) and second (1920) editions, pointing out that 
Weber introduced the notion of Jewish pariah capitalism in the second in 
order to defuse Sombart’s famous claim in 1911 about their role in the origin 
of capitalist practices (Barbalet, 2005). The problem obviously continued to 
bother Weber well after the first flurry of PE critiques had subsided, and he 
chose no longer to participate. For the fullest examination of Weber’s mono-
graph in terms of his own writerly intentions, and the history of the text as 
a component of Weber’s “master plan” in the sociology of religion, the best 
source is Schluchter’s 2004 article. He also adverts to “the pariah problem” 
briefly—”a constant narrowing of spiritual horizons” that surfaced among 
Jews as their theocratic organization strengthened— giving a sensible re-
sponse to Weber’s critics, though not one that will likely satisfy historians of 
Judaism who are fully versed in its intricacies, which are vast (Schluchter, 
2004: 48-50).
Gary Abraham rendered a detailed chronology of the arguments for and 
against Weber to 1991 or so in his Max Weber and the Jewish Question, the only 
monograph of its kind in English (Abraham, 1992: 8-20). Despite its intrinsic 
qualities and obvious seriousness (his guide in the work was Fritz Ringer at 
the University of Pittsburgh), the study was not warmly received by a sig-
nificant cadre in the ranks of notable Weberians, mostly, I suspect, because 
the tiny suspicion was aroused that Weber participated in the anti-semitism 
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typical of his era, even if in an unconscious way. That Weber ever wrote or 
mouthed vigorously anti-semitic sentiments neither Abraham nor any other 
reputable scholar has ever claimed. But that he was a nationalistic German 
“of his age” would indeed have allowed him, without much thought, to view 
certain components of Judaism, real or imagined, in an unflattering light, or 
to write about it in a way that might be construed negatively by its proponents 
or champions, especially as sensitivities to such slights have grown exponen-
tially since his day. An example of one frontal assault on Weber for his alleged 
eurocentric insensitivity is Hans Derks’s “Nomads, Jews, and Pariahs” (1999), 
where he notes that Weber’s appraisal of the Bedouin is “almost aggressively 
negative… a description dominated by strong language like ‘adventurous,’ 
‘blood vengeance,’ ‘war,’ (street) robbing, etc.’ Their political organization 
is highly unstable (höchst labil) because they usually do not have strong top-
leaders (Derks, 1999: 27). Derks does not ask if Weber’s appraisal has any 
empirical validity, but instead chastizes him for describing the Bedouins in 
an uncomplimentary way. This rhetoric expresses the Dances with Wolves syn-
drome among modern scholars when any criticism of premodern societies 
becomes verboten.
The most recent re-examination of “the pariah question” occurs in Da-
vid Nirenberg’s popularization, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (Nirenberg, 
2013), where he combines brief remarks about Weber with those on Werner 
Sombart, whose ideas about Jews and the origins of capitalism opposed We-
ber’s. Nirenberg incorrectly observes “It was in order to make this point and 
thus quarantine the ‘spirit of capitalism’ from those who would infect it with 
Jewish influence, that Weber invented the sociological concept of the ‘Jew as 
Pariah’… Once again sociology recapitulates soteriology and draws its tools 
from the same kit” (ibid., 443-44). One wonders how Momigliano, whose an-
nual residence at the University of Chicago worked so well for him and his 
large audiences, would evaluate Nirenberg’s breezy commentary, since the 
latter teaches in the Social Thought Program at this same university where 
Momigliano once delivered his extraordinary lectures.
Momigliano’s Critique
Momigliano’s own “Note” on the pariah question is characteristically dense, 
crisp, and unambiguous. As in all his works, he refers to his predecessors in 
the debate knowingly, so in order to follow his remarks accurately, one must 
backtrack to his sources, which, as often as not, were published in a cluster 
of foreign languages. (This perhaps more than anything is what accounts 
for Momigliano’s putative lack of influence among historians educated in 
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the last two decades or so: his arguments are simply too hard to follow or 
criticize sheerly in terms of his source material; plus, many items in his large 
bibliographies are not yet available online.) His footnotes were as famous as 
his texts, and Footnote 4 proves the case: “Among discussions of Weber’s 
texts on Judaism, I shall mention only W. Caspari, Die Gottesgemeinde vom 
Sinai und das nachmalige Volk Israel. Auseinandersetzungen mit Max Weber, Güter-
sloh, 1922” (which no other specialist who has written about the topic seems 
to know), followed by complete citations to the more standard works, by 
Schiper, Guttmann, Taubes, Raphaël, and “the most important work,” by 
H. Liebeschütz. But he also brings in essays by J. Freund, F. Parente, and A. 
Causse, who are seldom invoked in this context, plus more standard works 
by Holstein and even Bourdieu. Even if a student knew enough French and 
German to read these articles, considerable time would be required to go 
through them with the kind of attention to detail that Momigliano always 
evidenced in his synthetic critiques. Luckily for his readers, though, his in-
terpretations have proven resilient and reliable, so rather than chasing down 
his sources, one settles in for the comfortable guided tour through what are 
often very strange lands indeed.
Those familiar with Momigliano’s standard rhetorical procedures imme-
diately note that despite his habitual critical bent, he shows great respect for 
Weber’s position, even when he disagrees with it. (Momigliano’s impatience 
for ordinary or substandard discourse was documented by a colleague while 
he taught in Bristol, UK in 1947: “Henry Gifford… remembers him sitting 
at meetings of the Arts Board, ‘against the wall, rapidly running through 
booksellers’ catalogues, and only now and then lifting his head to make a 
good-natured but caustic comment on the proceedings’” [Brown, 1989: 419]). 
In workmanlike fashion, he goes through Ancient Judaism and quotes all the 
passages pertinent to his argument, both in English and in the original Ger-
man, since no translation is ever quite adequate to his needs. He also informs 
his reader that although the word “pariah” as applied to Jews has a long his-
tory, back at least to Michael Beer’s play, Der Paria, in 1823, and culminating 
in Hannah Arendt’s famous 1944 essay, “Weber had something else in mind” 
(Momigliano, 1984: 342). Here he launches into a blow-by-blow recounting 
of Weber’s remarks about the pariah-condition of Jews, not only in Ancient 
Judaism, but also in famous passages from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which have 
been available in From Max Weber for nearly 70 years (Weber, 1946: 66, 96, 
114, 189-90, 399; see also Weber’s Religion in India, 11f, 17, 18, 19, 34, etc.). 
One of the main questions emanating from critics of Weber has been 
whether the Jews chose to segregate themselves, as he claimed, or if they were 
forced into behavioral, spiritual, or political ghettoes by the host peoples sur-
rounding them in their position as Gastvolk. As Momigliano puts it: “He em-
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phasizes that the Jews deliberately chose to become pariahs—a choice arising 
from definite religious and moral beliefs and expressed by voluntary ritual 
segregation. As Weber says, the Jews segregated ‘voluntarily and not under 
pressure from external rejection’” (ibid., p. 343). Another repeated criticism in 
the literature involves Weber’s apparent conception of Judaism as being fairly 
monolithic over time (between the 8th century B.C. and the modern day) in 
terms of its beliefs and accompanying practices of its followers. Many histori-
ans, including the dean of Jewish history, Salo Baron, have taken exception 
to this portrayal of Jewish ideas and practices (Baron, 1952, I:23-25, 297n1; 
Abraham, 1992: 11), which is all the more interesting since Weber reflected on 
this issue, as he did other thorny questions surrounding Jewish history, but de-
cided to stick with his sense of things rather than bend to received wisdom. As 
Freddy Raphaël explains, Weber also bravely challenged the reigning ortho-
doxy espoused by Wellhausen and his followers regarding the living impact, 
meaning, and historical origins of the “ritual Decalogue” (Exodus 34) versus 
the “ethical Decalogue” (Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5), and seems to have been 
right despite his lack of access to archaeological or textual data (Raphaël, 
1973: 47). 
Swiftly laying out Weber on his pariah usage, Momigliano launches his 
critique: “Clarity, however, ceases at this point.” He wonders why Weber 
“does not yet explain why and in what sense a guest people necessarily lacks 
an autonomous political organization or vice versa,” and perhaps even more 
bothersome, “Weber seems to suggest that an ethic of resentment (Ressentiment) 
is characteric of the Jews as pariahs,” (ibid., 343) reminding readers of Weber’s 
fondness for Nietzsche. From this point Momigliano invokes fine points of 
Jewish history, political and theological, which require expert knowledge to 
decipher or criticize, and given the extraordinary complexity of the subject, 
very few modern sociologists would be equipped to do more than watch the 
performance unfold. Weber’s “feverish style of composition” (345) is blamed 
in part for confusions which Momigliano sees in Weber’s various treatments 
of the Jews, the Indian castes of pariahs, and the pariah condition in more 
modern societies. He takes pity on his uninformed readers: “Given these ele-
ments of obscurity, the best we can do is to outline the attitude of the Jews 
towards political power, remaining as it does fairly constant throughout the 
centuries. We want to see whether it is compatible with that feature of a pariah 
nation which emerges more clearly from Weber’s pages, namely the voluntary 
segregation and renunciation of political power with its implication of an ethic 
of resentment” (ibid.). And when Momigliano makes broad statements of fact, 
the reader must accept them as given, even if Weber might have argued to the 
contrary: “The whole Jewish religious tradition from the older strata of the 
Bible to the present day presupposes that the Jews are committed by pact to 
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obey a divine law and are entitled under certain conditions to own a territory 
granted to them by God” (ibid.).
One of Momigliano’s recognizable tropes is to imitate Weber at his best, 
comparing concepts and events over time and civilizations, performing a 
truly comparative historiography or sociology. Thus, he concludes a long dis-
quisition on Jewish history and dogma with this intriguing query: “Weber’s 
primary contention is that the Jews themselves chose to be pariahs because of 
their religious attitude,” as opposed to the “new interpretation” holding that 
their segregation was forced upon them. This new interpretation “would not, 
therefore, explain what after all Weber wanted to explain when he labelled 
the Jews as pariahs: their inability to contribute to the modern forms of ad-
vanced capitalism, as the Calvinists did. It would also involve us in awkward 
comparative questions. Would Weber ever have referred to the Germans set-
tled on Roman territory in the Late Empire as pariahs?” (346). Momigliano’s 
frisky sense of historical humor is never far beneath the surface of his argu-
ments, especially when he is facing a foe whom he respects. 
After this lightly mocking inquiry that Weber cannot answer, he settles 
into his most substantial and useful criticism of Ancient Judaism: “One could of 
course develop compromise interpretations trying to combine voluntary and 
involuntary forces of the pariah status of the Jews. For instance, one could 
argue that the Jews remained permanent foreigners in the countries in which 
they settled by refusing to give up their original land; or one could argue 
(with some support from Weber himself ) that they were reduced to the status 
of pariahs by a mixture of subjective decisions about commensality and in-
termarriage and objective deprivations of territory and political rights. These 
compromise interpretations would certainly be nearer (almost by definition!) 
to the realities of Jewish ‘exile.’ But would they bring us nearer to the Indian 
model which was Weber’s starting point? What would we mean if we call the 
Jews pariahs?” (347). 
This line of critique evolves into one of the most sensible extant approach-
es to Weber’s interpretation of the Jewish historical experience. Momigliano 
ends his observations by giving back almost as much as he took away: “Much 
of what Weber said on ancient Judaism remains valid even if we eliminate his 
definition of it as a pariah-religion… The sympathetic understanding of the 
rabbis, against the entire tradition of German scholarship, is perhaps the most 
remarkable feature of Weber’s interpretation of Judaism” (348). It was the 
Jews’ “pact with God” according to Momigliano that protected them from 
the sort of exploitation, inner and outer, which victimized the true pariahs in 
India and elsewhere; it “therefore saved the Jews from whatever self-abase-
ment can be associated with the word pariah” (ibid.).
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Briefly Back to the Source
Thus, a great deal of ink has been consumed over the last 90 years worrying 
about what Weber meant by the term “pariah” and why he chose to use it, 
with most scholars, many of them experts on Jewish history, castigating him 
for what they regard as an inaccurate, if not demeaning, appellation. Strange-
ly enough, though, among his most efficient defenders were Hans Gerth and 
Don Martindale in their concise introduction to Ancient Judaism, which they 
translated long ago (1952) into English. They do not apologize nor excoriate 
Weber, but instead place his use of “pariah” in the context of Salo Baron’s 
critique: “A final theme requiring special attention is Weber’s characteriza-
tion of Jewry as a ‘pariah people.’ The term is unfortunately lending itself to 
misconceptions. Weber did not intend a contemptuous attitude toward Jewry. 
He uses the terms ‘pariah people’ and ‘guest people’ in a technical sense” 
(Weber, 1952: xxiii). They then commit four densely packed pages to an ex-
planation and defense of Weber’s conceptualization, saying en passant that Salo 
Baron’s famous, critical footnote regarding Weber (Baron, 1937: III, footnote 
6) – which likely inspired and legitimated most critiques that followed, except, 
very interestingly Momigliano’s, who never mentions Baron in this context – 
“rests essentially on reading too much into the concept” (Weber, 1952: xxiv). 
Gerth and Martindale then answer Baron with their own theory of how reli-
gious groups can weaken or heighten their “pariah status” as “guests” within 
a “host” culture by virtue of how vigorously they adhere to their original 
ideas, as opposed to blending or otherwise adapting to their new situation. 
Gerth and Martindale continue with shrewd references on the one hand to 
Robert Ezra Park’s famous concept of “marginal man” (which he took from 
his teacher, Simmel, of course), and on the other to Bienenfeld’s lesser known 
study, The Germans and the Jews (Bienenfeld, 1939). More importantly, though, 
they explain that Weber’s meaning of pariah as applied to the Jews did not 
equate the Jews’ experience with that of the Indian pariah caste (original-
ly drum-beaters in festivals, and as such, not used in a disparaging sense): 
“Rather, he emphasized three essential differences” (ibid., xxvi). The Jews’ pa-
riah condition occurred in social settings free of castes; reincarnation did not 
apply to them, but messianism did; and “ritualistic correctness, circumcision, 
dietary prescriptions and the Sabbath rules combined with ethical univer-
salism, hostility toward all magic and irrational salvation striving” gave the 
Jews’ pariah condition its uniqueness.
Gerth and Martindale fortified these remarks with another pregnant foot-
note six years later when they published their translation of The Religion of India 
(1958a, 11n), where they give a three-point definition of “guest people” that 
this time focuses more on Gypsies than Jews: “Weber’s frequent comparative 
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references to the Jains, the ‘Jews of the East’ and to the Jews of the occidental 
Middle Ages seem evidence for the soundness of this procedure.” 
Ancient Judaism is filled with references to the pariah-condition of Jews (We-
ber, 1952: 3, 51, 336-355 [“The Pariah Community”], 356, 363, 375-76, 417, 
424, the final page of the book). He concludes the study with this sentiment: 
“And there is the strength of the firmly structured social communities, the 
family, and the congregation, which the apostate lost without the prospect of 
finding equally valuable and certain affiliation with the Christian congrega-
tions. All of this makes the Jewish community remain in its self-chosen situa-
tion as a pariah people as long and as far as the unbroken spirit of the Jewish 
law, and that is to say, the spirit of the Pharisees, and the rabbis of late antiq-
uity, continued and continues to live on” (Weber, 1952: 424). This does not 
sound dismissive, critical, condemnatory, or insensitive. It reads like a sober 
reflection upon the condition of Jews as they “wandered” from place to place, 
host culture to host culture, either by choice or dire necessity. 
When Momigliano and others have objected to Weber’s use of the term, it 
probably says more about our contemporary dislike of the word – “He became 
a pariah among his colleagues on Wall Street when his status as an informer 
against their insider trading was revealed” – than about the limitations of 
Weber’s conceptualization or about the actual experience of Jews through 
their extraordinarily durable history. Put another way, Weber admired the 
Jews for many reasons, those remembered only in texts, and those who visited 
his home regularly for intellectual exchange, yet he believed what he said to 
his student audience in “Science as a Vocation,” so he set aside his personal 
affections when “doing science.” When he was theorizing, he was all business 
and no sentiment, so for him “pariah people” was not an aspersion but an il-
luminating analytic device.
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